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the pleasure of appreciation; and I am glad to have the opportunity of stating that this book is characterised by all that versatility, openness of mind, brightness of expression, and aptness of illustration, that we have learned to expect in any work by Mr. Russell. As an instance of a particularly good statement, reference may be made to his treatment of the general nature of pleasure and discomfort (pp. 68-72) and I may conclude this notice by quoting a passage in which the ethical bearing of the behaviourist psychology is very well indicated: "When some desire that we should be ashamed of is attributed to us," he remarks (pp. 31-2) "we notice that we have never had it consciously, in the sense of saying to ourselves, 'I wish that would happen.' We therefore look for some other interpretation of our actions, and regard our friends as very unjust when they refuse to be convinced by our repudiation of what we hold to be a calumny. . . . We say: 'I desire to be kind to my friends, honourable in business, philanthropic towards the poor, public-spirited in politics.' So long as we refuse to allow ourselves, even in the watches of the night, to avow any contrary desires, we may be bullies at home, shady in the city, skinflints in paying wages and profiteers in dealing with the public; yet, if only conscious motives are to count in moral valuation, we shall remain model characters." The deceitfulness of the human heart has, of course, been long familiar to us; but behaviourism certainly helps us to see its explanation more clearly. The only doubt is whether the *seeing* of it is itself an instance of "behaviour" in the technical sense.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

A STUDY IN REALISM. By John Laird, M.A. London: Cambridge University Press; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. ix, 228.

Both for its matter and its manner this book should have a wide circle of readers. It is a shining example of how even in the midst of the most technical philosophical subtleties grace and wit may survive without any sacrifice of clearness and force. However the author may be physically constituted, he is mentally eupeptic, and he has been nourished evidently on a well-balanced diet. The resulting sense of reserve and poise adds greatly to the comfort of the reader.

The author would probably resent being tagged with the label of any of the pre-existent species of Realists. He has points of agreement and disagreement with all of them. From the introduction I suspect the author would least resent the label of Neo-Reidism. He says: "If the shade of Reid could visit these regions to-day, it would greet Mr. Prichard of Oxford, but it would be startled by Mr. Alexander, bewildered by Mr. Russell, and distressed by Mr. Holt."

The fundamental thesis, that knowledge is of things as they really are, will hardly be satisfied with the essences which the critical Realists offer. His "are" includes existence as well as essence, the "that" as well as the "what." This is further implied in his criticism of Meinong's propositional objective as the subject matter of judgment. While the American Neo-Realists have neglected the subjective factor in knowledge, Russell, on the other hand, has given it too much of a rôle in his accounts of sense data.

The chapter headings are: Things We Perceive, Things Remembered and Expected, The Stuff of Fancy, The World of Common Belief, Principles, Values, The Mind, The Larger Outlook, and a well-done philosophic-literary "epilogue" on The Vision of Thales.

The assumptions of Professor Laird's Realism as he gives them are: (1) and most important, that "Things can be known as they really are," (2) and scarcely less important, "Matter is precisely what it appears to be when sufficient precautions have been taken to avoid confusion between the actual genuine appearances and the spurious. It follows, (3) that genuine appearances cannot contradict one another, and things cannot contradict one another. To say that things can be known means, of course, (4) that they can be known by us. But (5) as we are finite we can hope to know but a small part of the infinitude of existence. (6) We have no right to deny the assumption of psychology that any piece of thinking is a subtle web whose pattern was woven long before the days of our neolithic ancestors, and whose yarn even now is three parts spun in the blind loom of lines of branching nerves." So if we know anything "as it really is," we know it "despite the fact that we do not know much that pertains to its conditions and connections." A "thing" is "any entity whatsoever that can be apprehended by the mind." "Knowledge" is "a kind of discovery in which things are directly revealed or given to the mind." And

"the mind"—there is an entire chapter devoted to "the mind." But the reader will find some difficulty in squaring the contents of that chapter, and what is said of it in the chapters on the "World of Common Belief" and "Principles," with the above statement of knowledge which, however, is frankly admitted "not to be very precise."

The task and problems of the rest of the book consist, of course, in trying to state our world and experience in terms of these assumptions and definitions. If in knowledge things are directly revealed or presented "to the mind," the only cognitive character and business of the mind is simply to receive these revelations and presentations. But it turns out, inevitably, that these "revelations" and "presentations" of things are very Pickwickian. For, before the mind can "directly receive" the presentation, it must for "most of our knowledge" work like the dickens for it with all the machinery of observation, inference, experimentation, etc. It is very much as if one should say: "Dear Mind: As a slight token of friendship, I present you with the largest diamond in South Africa. To be sure, I do not know where it is, and I am not sure just how you can be sure that you have found the really largest one, and of course somebody else may claim the ownership of it, but these are little minor details which I am sure will not be taken too seriously between friends."

And this recalls that Professor Laird finds that the Pragmatists do not "take knowledge seriously." To one with as keen a sense of humor as Professor Laird's, the Pragmatist's reply must be obvious. For of course what this charge amounts to is that the Pragmatist does not take the presentative Realist's conception of knowledge seriously. His own, indeed, he takes seriously enough. And if he does not take the presentative Realist's conception seriously it is because he finds that knowledge as a direct presentation and revelation does not take itself and its task "seriously." This lack of seriousness shows in the treatment or lack of treatment of error, always a crucial topic for presentational Realism. When, after trenchantly criticising the Neo-Realistic explanation, he faces the problem for himself, Professor Laird simply throws up the sponge in the statement (p. 103) that "it is impossible to explain error. We must simply accept this eternal possibility, and try to be as careful and consistent as we can." There is, of course, a sense in which error cannot be explained, the sense in which we cannot say why the universe is "such that" it or anything else

should occur. But this is not the author's difficulty. He throws up his hand on error simply because he has no adequate working criterion for it.

In perceptive knowledge those perceptions are better intrinsically which are focal as compared with marginal percepts. But Professor Laird sees that "better" cannot be equated with truer (cf. the *Theætetus*), since false perceptions are as focal as true ones. In judgmental and inferential knowledge the problem is to remove contradiction from appearances, for "things cannot contradict each other." There is much to be desired here on the meaning of "contradiction" in mere appearances. How can mere presentations as such be in contradiction? Suppose the stick looks crooked and feels straight, what possible contradiction in this as mere presentation, unless one wishes to use the looks of the stick as a means to handling it.

At one or two points hopes are aroused in the reader that some additional light is to be thrown on that Cimmerian region of the relation of subsistential entities to existential things. But so far as I can see, these hopes are disappointed. We are assured that subsistential entities "hold of, apply to, are valid of," etc., existential things. But just what these phrases mean of one presentation as such in relation to another still seems a dark matter. They are left just where Plato left them in the *Parmenides*. But this is to be said, that Professor Laird is everywhere frankly conscious and vocal of these difficulties.

The limits of this notice forbid more than mere mention of the stimulating discussion of values. If the author should chance to see this notice, and should be oppressed by a sense of the futility of discussion within such limits, I assure him I share this feeling. I wish to say in closing, as I began, that this is a book which makes the reader hope for others from the author.

A. W. MOORE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

ALLIED SHIPPING CONTROL: AN EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. By J. A. Salter, C.B. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. Pp. xxiii, 372. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This book—one of a series of works on the economic and social history of the world war, edited under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—is an account of